This paper examines the monetary policy constraints facing economies on a fixed peg or managed float regime, contrasting the Mundell-Fleming Trilemma view against the Compensation view commonly found at central banks. While the former holds that foreign exchange inflows and outflows affect the domestic money base, constraining monetary policy under nonfloating regimes unless capital controls are adopted, the latter purports that endogenous sterilisation of foreign exchange flows invalidates this trade-off. The predictions of both theories are empirically evaluated for five East Asian economies using central bank balance sheets, vector error correction models and impulse response functions. The findings indicate that the dynamics for the economies studied correspond more closely to the Compensation view than the Trilemma view, suggesting that it is a sustained loss of foreign exchange reserves that imposes a relevant constraint on autonomy rather than the adoption of a non-floating exchange rate regime.
Introduction
Thought about the international monetary system and its working mechanisms has traditionally been guided by various notions of an "impossible trinity", according to which it is impossible for an economy to simultaneously achieve stable exchange rates, free capital movement and monetary policy independence. The theory goes that policy-makers are forced to choose a combination of any two of these goals, but cannot realise all three of them at the same time.
The most popular and arguably most influential representation of this Trilemma view is the Mundell-Fleming IS-LM-BP model, which holds that foreign exchange inflows and outflows directly affect the domestic money base under a fixed peg or managed float regime, making it impossible for an economy to pursue an independent monetary policy unless capital controls are adopted. While this view has been questioned from a variety of perspectives, with several studies arguing that the empirical effectiveness of sterilised foreign exchange market intervention (cf. Löffler et al., 2012; Ito, 2003) or the dominance of global financial cycles render the choice of the exchange rate regime irrelevant (cf. Rey, 2015) , the idea that an economy loses its autonomy when adopting a peg is still widely held on to in the literature, irrespective of theoretical orientation. This paper argues that the procedural principles underlying modern central bank systems largely invalidate the Trilemma trade-off, suggesting that an economy's degree of autonomy ultimately depends on its ability to accumulate foreign exchange rather than its choice of exchange rate regime. The paper builds to this argument through three sections: First, the Mundell-Fleming Trilemma is theoretically contrasted against the so-called Compensation view, a perspective commonly found in the writings of central bank practitioners (cf. Le Bourva, 1959 , 1962 Berger, 1972; Goodhart, 1984, pp. 291-292) which holds that endogenous sterilisation of foreign exchange flows offsets possible effects on domestic monetary policy. Second, the predictions of both theories are examined on the basis of central bank balance sheet data and evidence is provided showing that empirical dynamics correspond more closely to the Compensation view than the Trilemma view. Finally, several important consequences of these findings pertaining on an economy's political autonomy and sovereignty are identified and analysed. The main implication is that currency pegs may be less costly in autonomy terms than has been traditionally assumed, whereas the gains from floating or monetary union may not be as high as generally expected.
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Consider an economy with a fixed exchange rate regime and an open capital account, where the central bank stands ready to convert foreign currency to local currency at some pre-announced parity. In the Trilemma view, the central bank in such an economy is understood to increase the domestic money supply whenever there is an inflow of foreign exchange (vice versa in the case of outflows). The resulting one-to-one link between the items "net foreign exchange reserves" and "money base" (ALF R ↑ LM B ↑, where ∆ALF R = ∆LM B) on the central bank's balance sheet (figure 1) is said to deprive the central bank of its ability to set domestic interest rates by manipulating the money base, thus causing a loss of policy autonomy (cf. Ethier, 1995, p. 442; Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995, p. 75) . 1 Given free financial flows, the Trilemma view hence regards the choice of exchange rate regime as the determinant of policy autonomy. 
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The Compensation view, on the other hand, holds that a deviation of the money base in response to foreign exchange inflows would be prevented by movement in other balance sheet items, as such inflows would be offset by a decrease of other central bank assets (e.g.
ALF R ↑ AGS ↓) or an increase of other central bank liabilities (e.g. ALF R ↑ LCS ↑).
Such a compensating response could, contingent upon institutional factors and banks' liquidity preference, instantaneously absorb up to the full amount of the foreign exchange inflow (e.g. ∆ALF R = ∆LCS, where ∆LM B = 0), preventing interest rate-distorting effects on the money base. Transitory or minor residual effects on the money base would then merely reflect changes in the demand for precautionary reserve holdings or national variations in reserve requirements and their associated maintenance periods, with no bearing on the domestic interest rate.
Known as sterilisation, the Trilemma view sees neutralizing transactions of this kind as a secondary and discretionary measure that is largely ineffective (e.g. McCallum, 1996, p. 138) or even detrimental to the integrity of a fixed exchange rate system (cf. Mundell, 1963, p. 485) . In the Compensation view, by contrast, sterilisation is the logical consequence of the operation of an interest rate-targeting central bank system and is non-discretionary, as described by the former governor of the Bank of Japan, Shirakawa (2008, pp. 291-292) :
"It does not make [theoretical] Shirakawa goes on to outline how the purchase of foreign currency by Japanese authorities involves the simultaneous issuance of "Short-Term Financing Bills", which automatically sterilise the transaction. Even when this is not the case, offsetting transactions may nevertheless occur automatically at the initiative of the private sector, as argued by Goodhart (1984, pp. 191-192) Kaldor and Trevithick, 1981; Robinson, 1956, pp. 225-244) . It is the latter demand-driven sterilisation in particular that Le Bourva (1959; 1962) and Berger (1972) of the Banque de France term the "compensation principle" (cf. Lavoie, 1992) . 4
3 The author thanks Marc Lavoie for pointing out this distinction. 4 Ehnts and Barbaroux (2015) give an account of the historical development of the Compensation thesis.
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Within this framework, an economy remains autonomous so long as it maintains an inflow of foreign exchange, as its central bank faces no balance sheet constraint with respect to assets and liabilities denominated in its own currency and consequently no technical limitations to its ability to sterilise foreign exchange inflows (cf. Buiter, 2008) . 5
By contrast, an economy experiencing a sustained outflow is limited by its remaining stock of foreign exchange reserves. Only the latter would find its autonomy constrained, understood here as the ability to achieve its interest rate target (cf. Lavoie, 2001 ).
3 Empirical analysis In order to retrieve that part of the movement in balance sheet items that is due to an inflow of foreign exchange reserves, a standard Cholesky ordering is used to identify the orthogonalised impulse responses. Effects are assumed to run successively from net foreign exchange reserves to the money base before affecting other balance sheet items, arranged in order of decreasing importance as suggested by their outstanding positions.
While this approach primarily corresponds to the causality predicted by the Trilemma view, it also allows for the possibility of transitory or minor liquidity effects on the money base, e.g. rising private reserve positions in anticipation of increased payment commitments during an economic expansion or precautionary reserve holdings during periods of stress in the financial system. figure 1 , where equity capital excluded as it is not relevant to the question at hand.
The specific time frames were chosen so that the sample periods would coincide with significant foreign exchange reserve accumulation in the target economies while avoiding structural breaks within their balance sheets, i.e. instances where the outstanding position of any item becomes zero.
In order to eliminate cases where economies increase foreign reserve holdings by incurring foreign liabilities and reduce variation stemming from changes in the exchange rate, foreign liabilities (LF R) are subtracted from reserves (AF R) to obtain net figures (ALF R in figure 1 ) and subsequently converted to US dollars (ALF RU ) using the prevailing market exchange rate vis-à-vis local currency units (LCU ).
Finally, to ensure coherent treatment of balance sheet items across all five economies, the money base is adjusted in the cases of China and Hong Kong to maintain correspondence with its conventional definition, i.e. currency in circulation plus commercial bank reserves, which requires subtraction of components with a maturity larger than zero, including less liquid items and those kept in a non-discretionary fashion. 7
Data
The balance sheets of the five monetary authorities under study are shown in figures 2 to 6, with assets stacked in positive territory and liabilities stacked in negative territory. 8
All balance sheets indicate significant foreign exchange reserve accumulation in the period after the Asian Financial Crisis that, on the basis of a first-look visual observation, does not show any obvious association with the money base, which merely seems to increase linearly over time. Indeed, in several instances changes in the money base appear to correlate negatively with changes in net foreign exchange reserves in US dollars.
Several institutional observations are in order. While monetary policy in East Asia used to rely primarily on standing credit facilities, the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves within the last several years has shifted the focus towards the liability side of central bank balance sheets. All of the economies under consideration issued central bank securities in large amounts (LCS), which, in Taiwan's case, were complemented by so-called "re-deposits", reserves financial institutions are obliged to hold with the central bank (Yang and Shea, 2006) . In China, central bank bills played an important role up to
2009 (Lavoie and Wang, 2011; Körner and Ehnts, 2013) , when emphasis shifted towards required reserves (LRR), the ratios of which are substantially higher and more frequently adjusted than in other economies (Ma et al., 2013) . Also, government deposits (LGD)
have been a prominent item on the balance sheet of the Bank of Korea for several years and, most importantly, as a counterbalancing item to foreign exchange inflows in Hong Kong, which is a feature of many currency boards (cf. Dobrev, 1999) .
Taiwan and Malaysia both stabilise exchange rates to a greater degree than Korea, albeit at lower frequencies than China or Hong Kong. In addition, Malaysia and China rely on various types of capital controls, although those seem to be weakening somewhat in recent years due to some cautious stepwise official liberalisation of the capital account and, especially in the latter's case, unofficial circumvention via over-invoicing and underinvoicing of current account transactions.
As mentioned earlier, in order to ensure coherent treatment of balance sheet items across different economies, the "money base" as defined in China and Hong Kong is modified to correspond to the same concept as in other economies. In China, this requires accounting for the large positions of required reserves, which are either absent or negligible in other economies. Reserves absorbed in this way cannot be used for other purposes, so they essentially function like any other central bank security (cf. Bindseil, 2014, pp. 93-95) .
8 Liabilities are plotted on a negative scale only for exhibition. The actual data series are positive. 
The outstanding amount of required reserves is consequently approximated (as LRR)
and taken out of the money base. 9 This item is then summed up with central bank securities into a pseudo-instrument "required reserves plus central bank bills" (LRRCS)
to compensate for the structural shift between these two items. 
Estimations
In preparation for the estimations, all series were converted to natural logarithms and subjected to unit root tests to ensure that non-stationary series were present in all data sets, which was the case in each of the economies analysed. Furthermore, in each economy's data set, the presence of deterministic trends could not be ruled out for one or more balance sheet items. This is accounted for by including unrestricted constants and restricted trend terms in the specification of the VEC models, in line with Doornik (1998):
where Π can be represented by a loading matrix α and a cointegration matrix β, which determine the speed of adjustment and the cointegration space respectively
Using a lag order suggested by the Hanna-Quinn information criterion, the number of long-run stationary relations was determined using Johansen cointegration tests and specified in the final models that were used to obtain the orthogonalised impulse responses, on the basis of which the reactions of balance sheet items to a one-standard error increase in the natural log of net foreign exchange reserves in US dollars (lnALF RU ) were analysed. Finally, since interest primarily lies in the absolute size and direction of responses, the logged impulse responses are converted to mean responses in local currency terms, averaged over short and long horizons and presented in figure 7.
Figure 7: Mean impulse responses in levels
Mean responses to a 1% increase in net foreign exchange reserves, averaged over short-run (horizon 0 to 5) and long-run (6 to 47), in millions of local currency units Variance decompositions not reported here further confirm that variance in net foreign exchange reserves is a primary contributor to variance in the items showing the most significant impulse responses, whereas its contribution to variance in the money base is generally minor. One potential source of bias remaining is the possibility of higher degrees of integration in the series entering the models. This can be regarded as unlikely, however, given the finite growth exhibited by the series in levels and their conversion to natural logarithms, which further serves to stabilise growth behaviour.
Interpretation and implications
Transactions of the kind empirically observed here occur because interest rates act as a price signal mediating private and public sector balance sheets. Since the formulation of balance sheet quantities is simply the result of these transactions, inflows and outflows of foreign exchange do not affect the domestic money base and, by extension, the domestic interest rate level. In terms of the dichotomy between balance sheet policy and interest rate policy as given by Borio and Disyatat (2010) , foreign exchange transactions represent an instance of the former, whereas autonomy is exercised through the latter.
As a consequence, adoption of a non-floating exchange rate regime does not necessarily lead to a loss of policy autonomy; it may merely reduce the scope within which monetary policy can operate (cf. Moore, 1988, p. 274) . As long as an economy is accumulating foreign exchange, its central bank can set a short-term interest rate target in line with domestic policy objectives, thus restricting interest rate arbitrage (along the lines of the interest rate parity condition) to those rates further removed from official control, i.e. rates at the long end of the yield curve, yields on private sector securities, or rates on offshore markets. Policy-makers may choose not to exercise this autonomy; nonetheless they do have it. Asian Financial Crisis, when dissatisfaction with the IMF's crisis response led to calls for monetary integration as a form of protection from the negative externalities associated with dollar-pegging. The political reality in the region made institutionalisation of the process difficult, however, and it seems that acceptance of this fact has served East Asian economies rather well. The post-crisis strategy of adopting similarly structured currency baskets has kept intra-regional exchange rates relatively stable while providing more flexibility than would monetary union (cf. Williamson, 1996; Yoshino et al., 2004) .
In short, putting pragmatism ahead of higher, possibly unattainable goals may be a more effective strategy for achieving regional stability and prosperity. 1.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) lnLMB t−1 0.00000 1.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) lnLCS t−1 0.00000 0.00000 1.00000 0.00000 0.00000 (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) lnLGD t−1 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 1.00000 0.00000 (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) lnAGS t−1 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 1.00000 (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0 
